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Using machine learning to guide automated intrusion response
by Andre LOPES
Traditionally Intrusion Response Systems (IRSs) have had a strong reliance on net-
work administrators to perform various responses for a network. Though this is
expected, particularly with networks containing sensitive data, it is not completely
practical, considering the ever growing demand for speed, scalability and automa-
tion in computer networks. This work presents a proof of concept automated IRS
that provides both for networks containing sensitive data and high speed networks,
by using basic responses for complex attacks, and by using reinforcement learning
for direct attacks. Responses for the latter are done by creating a response system
that is able to learn from the effectiveness of its own responses. This work is evalu-
ated in its effectiveness against the deactivation issue, which is concerned with the
problem of automatically deactivating network responses after they’ve been acti-
vated by an IRS. All tests are conducted using an emulated network, that was de-
signed to replicate real network behavior. Simulated attacks were used to train the
IRS. Results of training were evaluated at intervals of 100, 500, 1000 and 2000 at-
tacks. The findings of this work indicate that while applying reinforcement learning
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Network security is a prerequisite for any computer network [3], especially those
containing sensitive data. IRSs are a key component in defending networks as they
either prevent an attack from happening, or stop an attack from succeeding. IRSs
are often accompanied by Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), which provide alerts
about suspicious network behavior or data. IRSs make use of alerts, along with re-
sponse policies, to best decide how to respond to an attack. Response policies make
changes to a network to counter attacks, and are either enacted manually by a net-
work administrator, or automatically by an IRS. These policies are, however, often
not deactivated automatically, and, depending on the type of response, can cause
damage to the network if not appropriately deactivated by a network administrator.
1.1 Research description
The problem of determining the best time to deactivate a response policy, known
as the deactivation issue, is challenging and has scarcely been researched. A related
approach to this issue is to determine the likelihood of attacks being successful, and
based off of the likelihood value, use an upper-bound and lower-bound threshold to
determine when response policies need to be activated and deactivated [20]. How-
ever, the issue of what value to set the upper-bound and lower-bound values to, still
remains.
A potential solution to this problem is to use machine learning to determine when
to enable and disable response policies. The challenge with machine learning is that
there is no certainty to the values they output, and as a result, could cause dam-
age to the network they protect with the decisions they make. For example, the
upper-bound and lower-bound values may be set too closely to one another, caus-
ing response policies to be rapidly activated and deactivated, causing a degradation
in network performance. This is the reason why machine learning, and more specif-
ically, even reinforcement learning, is applied to IDSs [7], where mistakes are often
tolerated in the form of false positives, but rarely applied to IRSs, where mistakes
directly affect the network.
The issue of deactivating response policies with thresholds is an example of where
metrics have to be set prior to running an automated IRS. This problem extends to
many IRSs that use metrics to establish how aggressively they’ll respond to a po-
tential threat. The main issue with using such metrics, is that there is not always a
definitive method used to set them [34]. In this work, we try to counteract this by
using reinforcement learning to learn these metrics automatically. To avoid previ-
ous issues related to machine learning IRSs, the problem will be approached with
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prediction in mind, whereby thresholds will not be estimated, but instead, deactiva-
tion/isolation times will. Additionally, responses will only be applied to Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks in order to minimize the potential damage to the protected net-
work in the event that the prediction was incorrect. Examples of mitigation strate-
gies for other attack types will be provided, but only as a proof of concept to show-
case a more complete IRS.
This work, in addition to introducing an automated IRS, that learns from the effec-
tiveness of its own responses, and that uses reinforcement learning to respond to
potential threats, will also present results on its effectiveness in solving the deacti-
vation issue. If successful, the IRS will be able to reduce the reliance on network
administrators in managing network attacks and will also minimize service down-
time.
1.2 Research aims
The following work aims to create an IRS that uses reinforcement learning, a form
of machine learning, to determine when to enable and disable response policies.
The reinforcement learning algorithm will not be able to be trained from an existing
dataset, and will have to learn from the effectiveness of its own responses. To avoid
having the IRS damage the network it protects, especially during its training phases
where mistakes are prone, reinforcement learning models will only be applied to
DoS attacks. Additional responses, which do not make use of reinforcement learn-
ing, will be used to defend against more sensitive types of attacks.
Additionally, a test-bed will be created to benchmark the performance of the rein-
forcement learning algorithms, as well as to present the applicability of the sensitive
response types.
1.3 Research questions
RQ1 Can an Intrusion Response System (IRS) be created, such that, it will respond
appropriately according to the type of attack?
RQ2 Can an Intrusion Response System (IRS) be created, such that, it will learn from
the effectiveness of its own responses?
RQ3 Can an Intrusion Response System (IRS) be created, such that, it will deactivate
network policies at optimal times?
1.4 Thesis structure
As stated in the above sections, this thesis will present information relating to the
creation and evaluation of an Intrusion Response System (IRS). The purpose of its
creation, surrounding background knowledge, how it was created and how it per-
formed will be discussed in 6 chapters. This chapter, the introduction (1), explains
the context for why the research is being conducted. This context includes how
the IRS fits into existing works, and how it will contribute to them. Consequently,
research aims and Research Questions (RQs) that are relevant to this thesis are iden-
tified. The following chapter, background (2), discusses related works and topics. It
1.5. Summary 3
is particularly useful for understanding the technical aspects of the IRS and its con-
struction, however, it may also provide further context for how the IRS contributes
to existing works. The following two chapters, implementation (3) and experiment
(4), describe the approach used to answer the various RQs. These two chapters con-
stitute the core of the research being performed. The remaining two chapters, results
(5) and, conclusion and future work (6), discuss what was found by conducting the
research for all tests, and finally gives concluding remarks about the research and its
limitations.
There is no defined reading order and introductions will be included in each chap-
ter to summarize what has been discussed, and what is going to be discussed. The
reader is, however, encouraged to refer to the background (2) and implementation
(3) chapters, before reading the experiment chapter (4), as these preceding chapters
may provide useful context.
FIGURE 1.1: Thesis overview
1.5 Summary
This chapter has discussed the aims of this work and has mentioned how it relates
to existing works. IRSs that respond automatically to network attacks with the use
of reinforcement learning are not frequently seen in existing works. Furthermore,
many current implementations of IRSs make use of frameworks, which, while be-
ing capable of optimization through machine learning, contain various problems
that could negatively affect network performance. The IRS created in this work will
learn from previous attacks and the knowledge that it learns will be tested by at-
tempting to automate the activation and deactivation process that normally proves





The previous chapter (1) introduced a problem with IRSs, whereby, responses that
are activated automatically are not deactivated automatically. The problem is known
as the deactivation issue, and it can negatively affect a network if not handled cor-
rectly by a network administrator. The previous chapter also mentions how this
work will reduce reliance on network administrators while attempting to provide a
solution to the deactivation issue. These two are accomplished through the use of
machine learning in IRSs, which is not often used due to the uncertainty of the val-
ues that machine learning models output. It is for this reason that machine learning
will only be applied to DoS attacks, to minimize the damages inflicted on the net-
work when the IRS responds incorrectly. To complete the IRS, other types of attacks
will be mitigated, but without the use of machine learning.
This chapter provides technical information that is most useful in the experiment
chapter (4), but may also aid in situating this work with regards to existing works.
The information discussed describes the basic structure of intrusion response (2.1),
and how learning can be performed in the form of supervised learning (2.2) and rein-
forcement learning (2.3). These three sections discuss the majority of the knowledge
needed to understand the IRS in the experiment chapter, however, the following two
sections, network emulation (2.4) and digital forensics (2.5), are still useful for un-
derstanding the test-bed and the different responses that were created, respectively.
The remaining section on SOAR (2.6) provides information on a network security
approach, that while not implemented in this work, does share the similar aim of
reducing administrator involvement, and becomes particularly relevant when dis-
cussing future directions of this work.
2.1 Intrusion response
Intrusion response is the field concerned with responding to network attacks when
given an alert. These systems work alongside IDSs, which are responsible for iden-
tifying network attacks and subsequently generating alerts. Like IDSs, IRSs are im-
plemented using various methods. Taxonomies exist to classify these methods and
the features they provide. These taxonomies are often similar, and contain the same
concepts, however, the descriptions of these similar concepts differ. The following
section attempts to simplify the descriptions of the various concepts in IRSs while
providing a taxonomy (figure 2.1) for reference.
2.1.1 Levels of automation
Response systems can be placed into three categories. They can exist as notification
systems, manual response systems or automated response systems. These categories
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create what is known as the levels of automation [19, 31, 32, 33].
• Notification systems act to alert a network administrator about an attack. Ad-
ministrators are required to respond to the attack themselves.
• Manual response systems, which in addition to alerting the network administra-
tor about an attack, also provides a set of pre-configured responses, requiring
less human intervention.
• Automated response systems do not require any human interaction as they re-
spond to attacks independently.
The first two categories (notification and manual response systems) can be consid-
ered passive response systems, and can therefore be handled by an IDS. The last
category (automated response system) is an active response system, and can only be
handled by an IRS [1, 2, 3].
The remaining sections will list and describe further distinctions between automated
response systems. For clarity, figure 2.1 has been created to summarize the informa-
tion presented.
FIGURE 2.1: Our assessment of an IRS taxonomy
2.1.2 Adjustment ability
The ability to learn from previous responses and how effective they are, determines
whether a response system is able to adjust or not. A response system can either be
non-adaptive or adaptive [19, 31, 32, 33].
• Non-adaptive systems will always respond in the same way for the remainder
of their execution. This does not change unless an administrator manually
intervenes.
• Adaptive systems will respond differently throughout the duration of the sys-
tem’s execution. The reasoning behind why they adapt can vary. The system
could learn from previous attacks, or implement a cost-sensitive response se-
lection model (see section 2.1.3), or both. It could also start receiving different
inputs from another IDS on the network, which would cause the responses to
change.
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2.1.3 Response selection
An automated IRS needs a way of responding to an attack. It can do this either
statically, dynamically or through a cost-sensitive measure [19, 31, 32, 33].
• Static mapping determines a response based on the type of attack. While sim-
ple to build, this can be exploited, as attackers can learn how the system re-
sponds to certain actions. If the system responds by shutting down services,
or dropping packets, attackers can use this to perform a DoS attack, whereby
legitimate users will not be able to make use of the service.
• Dynamic mapping responds to an attack by taking into account the overall state
of the network. For instance, if an attack is severe, and is affecting multiple
services, more aggressive defense measures may be implemented. The ap-
proaches used to implement dynamic mapping are varied, however, none of
them gain knowledge from an attack [28].
• Cost-sensitive mapping is a unique approach, as it tries to balance the damage
caused by attackers, with the damage caused by the response system, since
both can lead to a disrupted network. This method is often reliant on a cost
model (see section 2.1.5) that determines the cost, or damage, that a specific
response will inflict. The best response will be the one that has the lowest cost
associated with it. Much like dynamic mapping, the approaches used in this
model vary, though unlike dynamic mapping, this model has the potential to
learn from previous attacks.
2.1.4 Response time
A response to an attack can occur either before or after an attack has happened.
Intrusion response systems can be classified into reactive or proactive, depending
on their approach [19, 31, 32].
• Reactive systems respond to an attack after it has occurred. They are often used
to train a response algorithm and are rarely implemented in practice, as they
fail to provide confidentiality for the data they’re protecting.
• Proactive systems make predictions about attacks. While they do provide full
security for a network, they are not always perfect, and can miss attacks, or
even needlessly interrupt the network for attacks that won’t happen.
2.1.5 Response cost
All responses to attacks have the ability to disrupt a network. It is possible to asso-
ciate a response cost to these responses, which can then be used by other systems
(such as in section 2.1.3). Response cost can be calculated using a static cost model,
static evaluated cost model or a dynamic evaluated cost model [31].
• Static cost model systems use expert knowledge to assign costs to each response.
The cost does not change throughout the execution of the system.
• Static evaluated cost model systems use an evaluation mechanism to assign cost
to responses. This evaluation mechanism measures the positive and negative
effects based on confidentiality, integrity, availability and performance, and
uses these as inputs. Like the static cost model, this approach also does not
change throughout the execution of the system.
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• Dynamic evaluated cost model systems evaluate cost based on the state of the
network. The cost of a response is increased if it interrupts a process with
many dependencies. Unlike the static and static evaluated cost models, this
approach will change the cost of responses throughout the execution of the
system.
2.1.6 Applying location
Intruders in a network will need to have an attack path associated with their in-
trusion. The attack path determines how the intruder managed to reach the target
machine on the network. Attack paths consist of four points:
• The start point (or intruders machine)
• The firewall point
• The midpoint (associated with intermediary machines that are exploited)
• The end point (the target)
An effective IRS will apply responses to the points that result in the lowest cost
for the network (see section 2.1.5), though very few IRSs actually implement this
feature [31].
2.1.7 Deactivation ability
It is often the case that a response will only need to be applied for a temporary period
of time, after which, the response should be deactivated, and the network restored to
its normal operational order. Deactivation ability is not a common feature included
in most IRSs, since it is a complex problem to decide when and how to deactivate a
response [20, 31].
2.2 Supervised learning
Supervised learning is a machine learning approach which analyzes data in order to
create generalizations, which can be used to solve various prediction or classifica-
tion problems. These generalizations are created through the means of various su-
pervised learning algorithms. Most algorithms are only suited to specific problems,
which is why careful selection of a supervised learning algorithm must be made.
Data is also important for the effectiveness of supervised learning tasks, which is
why data selection and preprocessing is also necessary. The following section will
cover these aspects by providing a basic summary of the problems and processes
surrounding supervised learning.
2.2.1 Relevant problems for supervised learning
Machine learning is applicable to problems that contain large amounts of data. The
field of data mining, where new data is created from the analysis of existing data,
is an example of one of the applications of machine learning [22]. Many tools exist,
such as sci-kit learn and Weka, which further allow machine learning to be used not
only by researchers in academia, but end users in the business world as well [15, 17,
27]. Supervised learning, in specific, is a machine learning approach that analyzes
labeled data, which is data that contains information on what the output, to certain
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inputs, should be (see section 2.2.2). Examples of its use are in medicine to classify
an illness, or astronomy to classify a galaxy, or even finance to predict market prices.
As can be seen, supervised learning is applicable to many fields, and consequently,
many types of problems.
2.2.2 Dataset structure
Datasets, in the context of supervised learning, contain features (columns) and in-
stances (rows), where each feature has a data type that is either continuous, cate-
gorical or binary. In addition, these datasets also contain a special feature known
as the label or output, which is the feature that is to be predicted when the super-
vised learning algorithm (better known as a model, once it has learned) is presented
with new data. A simple example of a dataset that collects information on various
insects would be fit for supervised learning, whereby the features indicate aspects
of an insect, such as the number of legs it has, or whether it is poisonous or not, and
instances would represent the data collected for a single insect. The label or output
field in each instance, would contain the name of the insect, thereby classifying it.
2.2.3 Dataset construction and pre-processing
Collecting the hypothetical insect dataset, mentioned in the previous section, might
prove problematic, as not all insects share the same features, and some features may
not sufficiently distinguish certain insects from one another. For example, a feature
which records whether the sting of an insect is painful or not, would not be ideal, as
not all insects sting, meaning that this feature would be irrelevant to them. Further-
more, the number of legs an insect has would also be a poor feature, as all insects
have six legs, therefore, this feature would not distinguish insects from one another.
Often, experts in the field are used to identify features for dataset construction, as
this avoids the issues mentioned.
Once features and data have been built and obtained, it is preferable to make sure
that the overall dataset won’t cause learning problems. Two particular examples of
problems that could arise are class imbalances and data dimensionality issues. The
class imbalance issue occurs if instances of one specific label, or type of insect, are
far more prominent than others types. Datasets with this issue will likely cause the
supervised learning algorithm to develop a bias for the prominent types, or insect
types [4]. The data dimensionality issue occurs if there are too many features in the
dataset. The repercussions of the data dimensionality issues could result in slow
learning times, high memory usage and noise while learning [21].
Though there are many issues with dataset construction, tools exist to aid in mitigat-
ing them. For example, feature construction is a tool that analyzes existing features
to create new and more predictive features. Another example is feature selection,
which is a tool that selects and keeps only the most predictive features among those
that exist. These two tools, in addition to creating a better dataset, will also reduce
the dimensionality of the data. More simple data cleaning tools also exist, which can
aid in other issues. An example is a tool that duplicates instances of the labeled data
that are not predominant in the dataset, which mitigates the class imbalance issue.
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2.2.4 Training and testing
After a dataset has been properly constructed, training can begin. In supervised
learning, training is performed with a training set and a testing set, whereby, one set
is used to create generalizations of the output, and the other is used to test its per-
formance. The training set and test set are often generated by splitting the original
dataset into two sets. Normally, two thirds are assigned to training, while a third
is assigned to testing. This form of training and test set construction is acceptable
when the dataset available is large, however, in circumstances with small datasets,
it may be preferable to perform cross-validation, whereby, the dataset is split into
separate equal folds, and the algorithm is tested multiple times on all folds but one,
with the last one being used for testing. This procedure is done until all folds have
been the test fold once, at which point, the performances of all tests are summarized
into a final performance, or error, score.
Algorithms can also be managed in addition to the dataset. The general procedure
for training is to select an algorithm, and training parameters associated with the
algorithm. Once selected, the combination is tested and the procedure is repeated
for different training parameters until the best set of training parameters for that
algorithm can be found. The entire procedure is then repeated again for another
algorithm. This process of testing can be time consuming, particularly if many al-
gorithms are being tested. Fortunately, procedures such as hyper-parameter opti-
mization exist, which can automatically test each algorithm with different training
parameters, and report back on the best combination. Auto-weka is an example of a
tool that has this ability [36].
2.3 Reinforcement learning
Reinforcement learning, often regarded as a machine learning method alongside su-
pervised and unsupervised learning, is a method that learns from experience, or
trial-and-error. It is often suited, and structured, for problems that involve the fol-
lowing:
• A goal
• An action to be taken
• Some form of sensing to be done
Not all reinforcement learning algorithms are the same though, as each have their
own unique parameters and are often suited for specific problems [16, 35].
2.3.1 Differences of reinforcement learning
Supervised learning is a form of learning where the outputs are trained to be gener-
alized. An example of the generalization of supervised learning is perhaps best seen
in a decision tree, where data is continuously split into separate, non-overlapping
sections, until a complete tree is built. Pruning, which is the process of limiting the
tree to a specific depth, is then performed to generalize the outputs so that the deci-
sion tree does not over-fit the training data, which is necessary for the decision tree
to be effective on new data. Reinforcement learning by contrast does not generalize
outputs, but instead maximizes rewards.
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Unsupervised learning differs from reinforcement learning as well, as its intention
is to uncover hidden structures within the data. K-means is an example an unsuper-
vised learning algorithm, where data is clustered into K clusters. The information
revealed from K-means indicates which data-points belong to which clusters. The
difference is similar to supervised learning, in that nothing is maximized, though it
is possible to use the results obtained from an unsupervised learning algorithm to
aid a reinforcement learning algorithm.
In addition to the differences mentioned, reinforcement learning is also well equipped
to handle interactive and non-stationary problems. An example of this is a chess
game, where the learning algorithm needs to move a chess piece, even if it has no
knowledge of the board configuration before it, and also has to adapt to the poten-
tially changing play-style of its opponent.
To summarize, all methods can potentially handle the same input, but as output, the
supervised learning algorithm will generalize its results, the unsupervised learning
algorithm will reveal information about the data, and the reinforcement learning
algorithm will maximize rewards.
2.3.2 Relevant problems for reinforcement learning
Reinforcement learning can be adapted to a variety of problems, though not all make
full use of its capabilities. For example, reinforcement learning can be used to select
an action when given nothing but a reward as guidance, and it will still learn, how-
ever, learning would be much more efficient if given an input, or state information
(see section 2.3.3). With some form of state information, correlations between the
optimal actions and the current state, can be made. This is better known as associa-
tive search. Figure 2.2 shows the difference diagrammatically.
FIGURE 2.2: Diagram of learning from rewards (left) compared to
learning from rewards and states (right)
Another capability of reinforcement learning is that of delayed rewards. Some prob-
lems may require a sense of foresight, whereby a number of specific actions will
need to be performed in order to get the maximum reward. It is possible for re-
inforcement learning algorithms to select the best immediate reward, which would
result in a greedy approach, and a less than optimal total reward. In order to obtain
the best reward, some reinforcement learning algorithms will purposely select poor
immediate rewards in order to get better rewards later on. Figure 2.3 shows an ex-
ample of this.
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FIGURE 2.3: Example of learning with delayed rewards
Problems that incorporate both associative search and delayed rewards, are known
to fully encompass the reinforcement learning problem.
The last capability mentioned is that of episodic or continuous tasks, though neither
is necessarily better than the other with respect to rewards. Some problems will re-
quire episodes to represent one run, such as one game of a chess match. In episodic
problems, there are always terminal states that represent the end of the episode, such
as checkmate in chess. Other problems do not have terminal states, and instead run
indefinitely, such as some control system, one that for instance would manage tem-
perature in a room based on the temperature outside.
2.3.3 Reinforcement learning structure
The basic structure of a reinforcement learning scenario can be divided into three
components: an agent, an environment and an action.
The agent is the primary component as it can be considered the reinforcement learn-
ing process itself. The agent remembers the states that the environment can be in
and learns which actions to perform by analyzing the reward it receives from the
environment. The environment is the elements surrounding the agent. The agent
may understand the environment and how it works (e.g. rules of a game), but does
not have absolute control over it, and can only influence it through actions. The ac-
tion is the agent’s choices and affects the interactions that the agent makes with the
environment. The action may also change the states of the environment if the envi-
ronment contains multiple states. In a game of chess, the environment would consist
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of the board, each chess piece, and the rules governing their movements. The agent
would learn the board configurations (as states) and invoke certain actions. The ac-
tions would be simple decisions on which pieces to move.
The basic components can be further de-constructed into four sub-elements: a pol-
icy, a reward signal, a value function and a model.
The policy defines how the agent will act in a given state. It specifies the probabilities
of selecting specific actions in a state. The optimal policy for a problem will indicate
which actions to choose to obtain the maximum reward for every state. The reward
signal, or simply reward, comes from the environment and indicates whether the
actions selected were good or bad. The signal is normally a real number. The value
function can be used by various agents, or reinforcement learning algorithms, to es-
timate the reward it will get from performing an action, or a set of actions. There
are variations to value functions, such as policy gradient methods, which learn proba-
bilities instead of action-value mappings, and actor-critic methods, which use neural
networks. All methods perform the same task, which is to estimate which action
should be selected. The model is an instance of the agent that has been trained to
some extent, and can be used to determine the next state and reward of the environ-
ment, given a certain action.
2.3.4 Parameters and trade-offs
Reinforcement learning algorithms contain a number of parameters, many of which
specify trade-offs that need to be considered for different problems. The parameters
discussed in this section are related to the reinforcement learning library, tensorforce
[23], and are not necessarily the formal definitions used throughout the literature.
Learning rate is used to train the learning agent. It specifies the importance of more
recent rewards, and if set to a high value, will more adversely affect how quick the
agent adapts to changes in an environment. A higher learning rate will however
make it more difficult for an agent to precisely converge to the correct value of a
given state. Generally, learning rates are decreased over time, so as to quickly adapt
initially, and then converge later on.
Discount is used in value functions for predicting rewards. It is primarily used for
continuous tasks (see section 2.3.2), to make sure that the rewards are limited to some
upper-bound. Without discount, the total reward would increase with every reward
signal, up to infinity. Values for discount can range from 0 to 1, with values closer to
0 making the learning agent more concerned with immediate rewards, and values
closer to 1 making the learning agent more concerned with future rewards. Values
of 1 will ignore the discount completely, and make the learning agent perform as it
does in episodic tasks.
Actions exploration is used in training and rewards. An agent can be exploitative,
meaning that it will find an action that works well, and continuously select that ac-
tion in the future. Alternatively, an agent can be explorative, and forgo the actions it
knows about for actions that is doesn’t know about. Exploration allows the learning
agent to try different actions that may result in even better rewards than previous
actions. Exploitation and exploration cannot be performed at the same time, and
being explorative will negatively affect rewards initially. For this reason, learning
14 Chapter 2. Background
algorithms are generally set to explore initially, and then exploit later on. One pa-
rameter that affects this change is the chance of an action being explorative, which
will decrease as the agent learns. Another parameter sets the number of time steps,
or actions the agent will wait, before applying the chance parameter again. For ex-
ample, in every 1000 actions, there will be a 50% chance that the agent selects an
explorative action.
2.3.5 Reinforcement learning algorithms
It is not always possible to create an algorithm that performs well in any given prob-
lem [40], which is why many reinforcement learning algorithms adapt to the prob-
lem by learning a policy. Examples of such algorithms include: Trust Region Policy
Optimization (TRPO) and Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO), which have both
proven to perform well on a variety of problems, irrespective of the problem’s com-
plexity. Unfortunately, not all reinforcement learning algorithms have managed to
obtain the same adaptability that is achieved with TRPO and PPO, and will instead
perform, for example, very well on complex problems, but poorly on simple prob-
lems, or, they will perform well on problems with discrete action spaces, but not on
problems with continuous action spaces (where actions chosen are not limited) [29,
30, 37].
TRPO is an algorithm designed to be scalable, allowing it to perform well with a
large amount of parameters, and reliable, allowing it to be useful on a number of
problems without hyper-parameter optimization [29]. PPO expands the capabilities
of TRPO by retaining its scalability and reliability, but also improves by reducing al-
gorithm complexity and increasing compatibility with other reinforcement learning
architectures [30].
2.4 Network emulation
Network emulation, sometimes referred to as network virtualization, though the
term is overloaded [38], is the field of study that combines the technologies of vir-
tualization and simulation to create a cost effective and realistic computer network.
Though not a perfect solution when compared to other alternatives, network emu-
lation still has its benefits and is particularly useful for testing purposes.
2.4.1 Network emulation structure
Network emulation is a testing approach between simulation and live testing. Some
aspects of the testing environment or test-bed, are simulated technology, while other
aspects consist of real technology. In general, the physical and data-link layers of the
Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model are simulated, while the layers in and
above the network layer are real [24]. To give an example, virtualized Network In-
terface Cards (vNICs) emulate the hardware of real Network Interface Cards (NICs),
and must replicate the encoding schemes used to convert digital data to a format that
can be used on a communication medium (e.g. copper cable). Furthering the exam-
ple, these vNICs must also replicate the multiplexing schemes used in the data-link
layer (e.g. time division multiplexing) [38]. The remaining layers of the OSI model,
in an emulated network, run real protocols and applications (e.g. Internet protocol
for the network layer). Figure 2.4 represents the above example visually through the
use of the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/Internet Protocol (IP) model.
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FIGURE 2.4: Example components of an emulated environment
What has been discussed in this section so far is a general description of emulation,
however, emulation systems do vary in their execution. In particular, their behavior
can be defined at three levels: the hardware level, the impairments level and the
network level [24].
The hardware level considers whether the emulation is executed in a centralized or
distributed system. Centralized systems are more common and simple to operate
as synchronization issues between systems do not exist. Unfortunately centralized
systems are limited in their computational power, which is a notable issue, consid-
ering that emulated networks do not scale well. The impairments level considers net-
work impairments such as jitter, packet loss or bandwidth limits. Emulated systems
are often perfect with regards to impairments, as the communication links between
hosts in a network are software emulated. These links are generally only limited
to the performance limitations of the host they’re running on [38]. To create a re-
alistic testing environment, these network impairments can be artificially added to
the emulated network. Unfortunately, adding these impairments can introduce fur-
ther unintentional impairments, such as the processing overhead that is required to
add them. Impairments can be added either at the kernel or user level. In order to
create reproducible results, these unintentional impairments must be accounted for
and negated. The network level considers the scenario in which testing is conducted.
Testing can be performed in a static emulation environment, where all parameters
about the network (including impairments) remains constant throughout testing.
Another approach is to use events to trigger changes to parameters in the network,
such as specific conditions being met. The last approach of the emulated variant is
the trace-based approach, where parameters of specific network configurations are
obtained, and used for testing. These network configurations often represent some
behavior in the network. Virtualization is an entirely different approach, where the
parameters of the network are constantly changing due to real network traffic. For
instance, a virtual router in other methods would retain a controlled packet loss
throughout the execution of the test-bed, however, with virtualization, packet loss
would be affected by factors such as the emulated size of the virtual router’s buffer,
which may overflow during high traffic scenarios. Virtualization is often favored for
the realistic behavior it provides, but it can also be used to setup specific scenarios.
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2.4.2 Technologies
As mentioned in the previous section, numerous emulation systems exist. Graphical
Network Simulator 3 (GNS3) is a particular example of an emulation tool/technology
that allows for the creation and execution of emulated network environments. These
environments require extensive setup, to the extent that is seen in real network
equipment [10]. Following the taxonomy mentioned in the previous section, GNS3
is a centralized system that implements its impairments at the kernel level and uses
virtualization to replicate network devices. Since GNS3 uses virtualization, it re-
quires the support of various virtualization technologies.
Virtualization technologies allow a single physical computer system to host multiple
isolated systems, each of which run in their own virtual environments. Methods of
virtualization include hypervisor-based and container-based.
Container-based methods run at the operating system level, that is, they require a host
operating system to run. Each virtualized system created with this method is re-
ferred to as a container, and runs as a normal process on the host machine, thus not
requiring their own kernels. Container-based methods are usually easier to setup
and are often lightweight [6], which is particularly useful for emulated systems that
do not scale well (see section 2.4.1). Hypervisor-based methods run at hardware level
(not to be confused with the hardware level in the previous section), meaning that
they do not necessarily need a host operating system. Each virtualized system cre-
ated with this method contains a guest operating system and an associated kernel,
which significantly increases the hard drive and memory space required to store
and run these systems. Furthermore, hypervisor-based methods have been shown
to have poorer performance in comparison to container-based methods [11, 41]. De-
spite their disadvantages, hypervisor-based methods have proved to be more ver-
satile, as they can support multiple operating system environments (e.g. Windows
and Linux) on the same system [6].
Many implementations of virtualization exist, each with their own unique purpose.
Docker and dynamips are two examples of virtualization tools that illustrate, to
some extent, the differences seen in various virtualzation implementations, and why
such implementations need to use specific virtualization methods.
Docker is a virtualization technology used for creating virtual environments. It uses
a container-based approach that is particularly useful for solving the issue of com-
putational reproducibility in research, whereby the results of research cannot be re-
created due to problems with code dependencies or documentation [5]. A hyper-
visor approach would not be ideal for docker, as it would be difficult to distribute
the potentially large images that contain the guest operating system and kernel. Dy-
namips is a virtualization technology used for Cisco routers. It more closely rep-
resents a hypervisor-based approach to virtualzation, however, with minor devi-
ations, as it does not allow the guest operating system to communicate with the
host operating system, and it has to emulate much of the hardware within Cisco
routers [25]. Container-based approaches would not be suitable for dynamips, as
the kernel in Cisco routers is tightly linked to the rest of the router’s functionality,
and thus would not operate without it. Dynamips would be far less compatible with
a container-based approach.
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2.4.3 Alternatives
All networks that use virtual servers, virtual NICs and virtual switches or virtual
routers are considered to be emulated networks [38]. Alternatives to this include
simulation and live experimentation [24].
Simulation is method that typically uses a specially crafted model to test very spe-
cific and simplified versions of the greater problem. It is economical and fast, but
does not run in real-time (often runs faster than real-time) and frequently requires
that simulated problems be evaluated in live or emulated test-beds as well. Many
tools, such as OPNET or the ns simulators, aid in simulation creation by providing
a core simulation engine and a set of pre-designed model protocols [8, 39].
Live experimentation uses real hardware and software components for the under-
lying network environment. It is ideal for gathering results, however, not always
practical, as it is inflexible and expensive. For example, live testing would not work
in a scenario that needs to test a technology that is not operational yet, whereas
other methods would be able to simulate or emulate the technology. Furthermore,
not only is there a large cost associated with the equipment required, but there is
also a large investment in terms of time to setup the equipment.
Network emulation isn’t perfect either. As mentioned before, it suffers from scalabil-
ity issues, since each network device requires a non-insignificant amount of memory
and processing power. This issue is particularly relevant with centralized emulation
systems, where computational resources are finite. Another issue with centralized
emulation systems, is that the available bandwidth to the real world is limited by the
NIC and connection available to the host system that runs the emulation software.
The last notable issue is that in some emulation systems, network traffic at, or below
layer 2 of the OSI model, cannot be perceived from the outside, which is especially
problematic for debugging purposes. Despite these imperfections, emulation is still
a viable option for creating realistic and controlled network environments, since it is
cheap and easy to setup in the context of research labs.
2.5 Digital forensics
The field of digital forensics is one that is concerned with the development and use of
tools or methods that aid in the investigation of computer related crimes. Network
forensics is a similar concept, but focuses on the exchange of network communica-
tion [9]. There are various difficulties not only in the creation of these tools/methods,
but also in general in the field of digital forensics. One of the more notable difficul-
ties is that of standardization. The field contains few standards, and many are not
complete or in use. The lack of standardization means that there is a lack of com-
monly followed procedures, which can be problematic, as improper procedures can
lead to data being lost at a crime scene. Despite the lack of standardization, some
procedures are followed. The following section will outline these procedures along
with the few standards that exist. The various difficulties in the field will also be
explained in detail.
2.5.1 Difficulties
The primary problem faced in digital forensics is the lack of standardization. Most
of the field is practitioner driven, which leads to many tools only being designed to
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solve a specific problem [26]. Communities supporting the development of digital
forensics standards are few in number, and the majority of them have ceased to be,
due to various issues, such as a lack of funding or interest. In addition, many of
the existing tools have become obsolete, due to evolving operating systems and file
formats. Encryption schemes have also become more sophisticated, making it easier
to obfuscate data. These problems have been projected to only get worse if the dete-
riorating nature of the field continues [13].
In the circumstances where data had been obtained, and tools were available, two
more problems would persist. The first is of processing power, in which certain ana-
lytical tasks may need to be forfeited due to the processing time required to analyze
the potentially large volumes of data. There have been arguments to create tools
with performance in mind, but these have largely gone unimplemented [13]. The
second issue after data has been collected, and assumedly processed, is that of the
legality regarding the information discovered. Legal issues are particularly sensitive
when a company that operates in multiple countries is involved, or when the servers
hosting the company’s data is outsourced [18, 26].
The last and consequential issue of the problems faced in digital forensics is the
lack of trained staff whom qualify to be digital forensics investigators [13]. Digital
forensics requires that investigators have knowledge not only on multiple operating
systems, file systems, and encryption schemes, but also on the legal issues surround-
ing them. Finding well trained and equipped staff is a problem, especially when few
standards exist, and when the tools available vary in how they operate.
2.5.2 Procedures
Though not standardized, there still exists some known procedures from the field of
forensics in general. The most notable, is that of disturbing or tampering with the
crime scene evidence, as this could make analysis more difficult and may invalidate
the evidence from a legal perspective. The ideal scenario would allow for an exact
replica of a suspect computer system to be created. This is unfortunately a complex
task, as the process of copying data from the suspect computer system may cause
data to be accidentally written to it. For hard drive backups, external block writ-
ers that act as an intermediary between the suspect hard drive and the backup hard
drive are often used to prevent these accidental writes to the suspect hard drive (see
figure 2.5). Once a backup is created, it is often preferable to create a hash, so as to
ensure the integrity of the data. It may also be preferable to create a file-by-file copy
in addition to a sector-by-sector copy of a suspect hard drive, as it would reduce
the complexity required for specific digital forensics tools, for instance, when recon-
structing files that were distributed across many suspect hard drives in a Redundant
Array of Inexpensive Disks (RAID) configuration [14].
FIGURE 2.5: Block writer procedure
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2.5.3 Standards and tools
The few communities that do exist in the field of digital forensics have attempted to
create standards, often through frameworks and tools. Many are, however, under-
appreciated or are never used [13].
The most notable example of this is PyFlag which is a framework that attempts to
merge disk forensics, memory forensics and network forensics in one package. It
was designed to provide high level information, such as intent, identity and time-
lines, so as to simplify the forensics process for the investigator. PyFlag is partic-
ularly well suited to digital forensics problems that require scalability, where large
files require processing [9]. Another example, created through the means of the dig-
ital forensics working group, is a taxonomy designed to define the research areas for
digital forensic. The taxonomy contained: evidence modeling, network forensics,
data volume, live acquisition, media types and control systems. It also approached
various other issues in the field of digital forensics, such as education and legal is-
sues [26]. Other tools that were not widely adopted include the bulk_extractor, which
can be used to extract all email addresses and Uniform Resource Locators (URLs)
from a computer’s hard drive. This tool was created for information archiving pur-
poses, with the intent of finding what services were used on a computer, but is usable
for digital forensics purposes as well [14]. Other tools have focused on the digital
forensics of social networks. One tool in particular creates what is referred to as
‘social snapshots’ of social network accounts. These snapshots contain information
about the account’s friends, exchanged messages and posted pictures [18].
2.6 SOAR
Enterprise networks expand both in size and complexity as new technological inno-
vations develop. This expansion, while potentially beneficial for enterprises, creates
a substantial strain on existing network defenses, which are already plagued with
various issues. There exists, however, frameworks and standards, such as Security
Orchestration, Automation and Response (SOAR), that aim to alleviate this strain.
Though still a work in progress, frameworks like SOAR give an insight into the fu-
ture of network defense, and steps are being taken to further develop them [12].
2.6.1 Issues approached
Network attacks are ever evolving, and many of the defenses created to thwart them
never achieve complete success. This is due to the fact that network security in many
enterprises require increasing amounts of data processing as the enterprise grows.
This large amount of data is often processed by network administrators, or human
experts, who then need to devise potential responses to attacks as well. Unfortu-
nately, it is not feasible for human experts in large network environments to both
analyze and respond to attacks in a short time frame. The Mean Time to Detect
(MTTD) is often too large and so too is the Mean Time to Respond (MTTR), which
reflects poorly in comparison to the time taken for an attacker to compromise a sys-
tem. The issues of late detection and response are only furthered by the diminishing
numbers of qualified staff in the field. The result of these issues is that enterprises
face increasing risk with their growth.
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2.6.2 Solution direction
The solution to the problems mentioned in the previous section calls for automation,
as with automated or even semi-automated systems, reliance on the already limited
number of staff will decrease, and will allow them, when necessary, to focus on re-
sponding to attacks.
SOAR, or also know as Security Automation and Orchestration (SAO), is a solution
stack that maintains certain standards that are used in the processes of detection and
response. The standards are designed to enable, to some degree, automation of the
steps in each of the processes, making the network more independent of the admin-
istrators that maintain it. To achieve this, SOAR products are often integrated with
systems that monitor network traffic, intelligence platforms that contain information
on attacks, and control systems that mange responses to attacks.
The overall aim of SOAR is to reduce the MTTD and MTTR, which if successful,
will enable faster responses to attacks, and will consequently minimize the damages
inflicted on an enterprise network.
2.7 Summary
This chapter has discussed related works and topics, and has presented the technical
details required for the experiment chapter (4). A taxonomy of intrusion response
(2.1) as well as the different approaches to learning, supervised (2.2) and reinforce-
ment (2.3), were discussed. These sections show that the structure of IRSs and of
learning methods vary greatly in implementation. The learning methods in particu-
lar follow completely different concepts and goals while learning. Furthermore, the
information provided on network emulation (2.4) explains the differences between
simulated, emulated and live networks, and also provides a basic structure of emu-
lated networks and mentions their associated technologies, such as GNS3. The final
two sections on digital forensics (2.5) and SOAR (2.6) mention the associated diffi-
culties that each face, with digital forensics expressing the importance of procedure,
whereby data should not be tampered with when collected, and SOAR expressing




The previous chapter (2) discussed a variety of related works. It can be seen that the
deactivation issue, which this work aims to contribute to, belongs to a much larger
taxonomy in IRSs, and is often not implemented in practice. Differences between
supervised and reinforcement learning were also provided. Though both forms of
learning are useful, it can be seen that reinforcement learning is preferable due to its
ability to be applied to interactive problems, where the ideal solution can change.
Other relevant information provided was about SOAR, which further justified the
need for automated IRSs, due to the issues of growth in large enterprises. Digital
forensics was also mentioned, and provided information on the procedures of re-
sponding to an attack. It can be seen that the evidence of an attack is susceptible to
corruption if proper procedure isn’t taken. Responses from an IRS therefore need
to be careful not to tamper with the evidence, though this can be difficult to ensure,
especially with an IRS that makes use of machine learning where the outputs are
uncertain. This particular issue will be addressed in the next chapter (4), however,
more relevant to this chapter was the section on network emulation (2.4), which dis-
cussed differences between emulation, simulation and live experimentation.
This chapter will present an overview of the test-bed, providing context for the tech-
nologies and network infrastructure that it uses. Both topics will be summarized
in the overview, and discussed in detail in their own sections. Furthermore, these
topics will be contrasted to real networks for comparison purposes, as the emulated
network, which is used for the test-bed, cannot replicate all the behavior of real net-
works, and therefore, requires some compromises.
It is worthwhile noting that each section of this chapter is designed to increase in
detail from the preceding section, with the overview being the least detailed, and
the technologies section being the most detailed.
3.1 Overview
In this section, an overview of the test-bed is provided by summarizing its structure.
The overview, which can be seen in figure 3.1, lists the three layers of the test-bed’s
structure: hardware, software and the emulated network. This section will discuss
how these layers relate to each other, while the subsequent sections will discuss each
of these layers in more detail.
The hardware layer represents the physical computer that the test-bed ran on. This
layer could be populated with multiple physical computers, which run together in a
distributed system (see section 2.4.1), however, the emulation software used, GNS3,
did not allow for a distributed setup, which is why only a single computer is used.
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FIGURE 3.1: Overview of test-bed structure
The limitations of having a single computer mean that less resources are available
for the emulated network, however, it does mean that the setup of the testing en-
vironment is easier. This layer allows for the execution of the software layer, using
hardware resources which will be discussed in the hardware and software section
(3.3.2).
The software layer allows for the execution of GNS3 and the test-bed scripts. GNS3
is the software used to create and run the emulated network, seen in the next layer.
Other software such as docker (see section 2.4.2) is also used at the software layer,
but is not depicted as it runs as part of GNS3. The details of all software used in
the test-bed are further discussed in the test-bed technologies section (3.3). The sec-
ond component of this layer, the test-bed scripts, were created for this work, and
contain the functionality required by the IDS and IRS, which is to create alerts and
learn from attacks. These scripts have been implemented at the software layer, as
it allows changes to be applied immediately without interrupting the network. The
alternative would be to create another virtual computer in the emulated network,
that would contain the test-bed scripts. The IDS and IRS code would then have to be
transfered to the virtual computer with every change, which happened frequently
when learning parameters were adjusted. In this instance, the versatility of emu-
lated networks was taken advantage of, as there is no difference between running
the scripts at the software layer or at the emulated network layer.
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The last layer represents the components of the emulated network. This network was
designed to replicate the behavior of a real network, which requires compromises
to be made. The emulated network is compared to a real network in more detail in
the network comparison section (3.2), however, it is worth mentioning how the com-
ponents communicate in this section. The most noticeable component is the user /
attacker node, which, from the perspective of the network, is supposed to commu-
nicate with the server as a normal user. It is, however, labeled as an attacker as well,
as it is assumed for testing purposes, that attacks will only occur from users who
are outside the network. Furthermore, no actual attacks are performed, and instead,
are simulated by having the IDS generate alerts for the IRS. In practice, the user /
attacker node only pings the server to see if responses are in effect. If they are, the
ping requests will fail to be received, and will either be dropped or rejected, depend-
ing on the response enacted. The server node itself does not host any services, and is
instead used to respond to the client’s ping requests. It is also setup to securely com-
municate with the IRS, and contains the required software dependencies to execute
software that may be part of a response (e.g. virus scanning software). The remain-
ing nodes are used purely for network infrastructure purposes, with the exception
of the IDS and IRS nodes, which will be discussed in the experiment chapter (4).
3.2 Network comparison
The previous section covered the emulated network, which can be seen in figure 3.1.
This section expands on the emulated network, by explaining each component in
more detail, and by comparing it to the real network that is was designed to emu-
late. A hierarchy has been created for the real network by using the layers: clients,
Internet, gateway and organization. For comparison, the emulated network men-
tioned in the previous section has been added to the right side of figure 3.2.
The clients layer considers normal users of the organization’s network who connect
to it from outside the network itself. These clients will be legitimate users of the net-
work, containing their own login credentials, and using these credentials to access
services from the server in the organization layer. It is however also assumed that
attackers of the network will reside here, and will attempt to take advantage of vul-
nerabilities of the network. Multiple users or attackers can exist in this layer in a real
network. Unfortunately, in an emulated network, it is computationally intensive to
create multiple users and attackers, therefore, only one user is used to represent the
client and attacker. However, as mentioned previously, for testing purposes, and
due to scope limitations, no attackers actually exist in the clients layer, and instead,
attacks are simulated by the IDS. In addition, the users will only issue ping com-
mands to the server, to ensure that network responses are working, which can be
verified if the ping requests are dropped or rejected.
The next layer, Internet, allows legitimate users and attackers alike to connect with
the organization. Since the organization’s router is directly connected to the Internet
itself, and does not contain any firewall restrictions by default, there is no discrimi-
nation as to who can communicate to the organization’s network. In real networks, it
is assumed that multiple Internet Service Providers (ISPs) will give users or attackers
the means to access the Internet, and subsequently the organization’s network. It is
consequently assumed that multiple IP addresses will communicate with the orga-
nization’s network, which requires that the IDS and IRS filter those IP addresses that
are attackers from those that are users. The emulated network unfortunately does
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FIGURE 3.2: Comparison of real and emulated network structure
not simulate this filtering process, as there is only one user in the clients layer and all
attacks are simulated. The Internet layer of the emulated network does however use
a random IP address to represent the user, even though no ISPs are involved. This is
done by manually assigning the random IP address to the client’s router, which also
contains a manually applied route mapping to the organization’s router. Though not
a perfect emulation of the Internet, this does allow the client to use a realistic IP ad-
dress, and if used with multiple users, would allow for a more realistic networking,
or Internet environment.
The gateway layer is concerned with access to the organization’s network. This layer
is directly connected to the Internet, the organization’s users and servers, and the
IDS and IRS systems that mitigate attacks. It is assumed that all network traffic will
have to pass through the organization’s gateway router to access the organization’s
network. This means that all network traffic passing through this point can be ana-
lyzed by the IDS to identify network attacks. Network traffic indicative of network
attacks can then be mitigated by sending alerts to the IRS, which will enact responses
on either the router or the server, or both. Since the gateway is only implemented by
a single router, it makes it possible for an attacker to view the internals of the net-
work. Additionally, attacks can be performed before being analyzed, as the network
traffic does not have to pass through the IDS. These issues can be fixed through the
use of a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), whereby, two routers are used with the IDS, and
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optionally the IRS, in between. Unfortunately, a DMZ was not used in the emulated
network, as its use would increase modeling complexity and computational resource
usage. For these reasons, only a single router was used. Additionally, for modeling
simplicity, this router made use of two IP addresses, with one for the connection be-
tween itself and the client’s router, and the other for the connection between itself
and the IDS and IRS, which, in the emulated network, is the host computer as is seen
in the software layer in the previous section.
The organization’s network consists of users, who use network resources and ser-
vices locally, or connect to services from inside the network itself. Like the users in
the clients layer, these are also legitimate users of the network with their own login
credentials, however, unlike the clients layer, it is assumed that there are no attack-
ers among the users. This assumption is made, as defending against network attacks
from within a network itself is a different problem to defending against external net-
work attacks. As such, it is considered out of scope for the purposes of this work.
The other component of the organization layer is the server, which is intended to
provide services to both internal and external users of the network. The emulated
network contains some differences to real networks though. In particular, it consid-
ers the server as the only device in the organization layer. This is done, as the addi-
tion of users at this layer would serve no purpose if none among them are attackers.
Additionally, this aids in reducing the computational requirements of the emulated
network. Another notable difference regards the server’s behavior, whereby, it will
not host any services and will only respond to ping requests, as mentioned in the
previous section. This is done, as attacks are simulated, and therefore, no benefit is
gained by hosting network services, since they cannot be attacked. Removing the
requirement of hosting network services further reduces modeling complexity and
the computational requirements of the emulated network.
3.3 Technologies
The aim of this section is to provide context for the software and hardware depen-
dencies of the test-bed. It is divided into two sub-sections, which when combined,
summarizes the hardware and software used in the test-bed, and covers the first
two layers of the overview in figure 3.1. The first sub-section (3.3.1) categorizes the
various software components used in the test-bed and explains how they contribute
to it. Figure 3.3 is used to summarize the information discussed in this sub-section.
The following sub-section (3.3.2) briefly discusses the hardware components and
provides a full list of all software used, along with their version numbers.
3.3.1 Software applicability
Networks require a communications medium by which network data can be trans-
fered. In the instance of real networks, this can be implemented through various
physical or wireless mediums (e.g. copper cable). However, in the instance of an em-
ulated network with virtual machines, this medium must be created through other
means (see section 2.4.1). GNS3 is the software used to simulate the communica-
tions medium in the test-bed. This software does contain the ability to add network
impairments such as packet loss, jitter and delay, however, these were ignored as
the aims of this work were to test if the IRS could learn from attacks, therefore, the
test-bed assumes perfect networking conditions.
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FIGURE 3.3: Technology infrastructure
Another prerequisite of networks involves the protocols they use. Those that were
manually implemented in the test-bed consisted of: Secure Shell (SSH), Secure Copy
(SCP) and telnet. These protocols were used to enact responses from the IRS, to the
router and server. In specific, SCP was used to transfer virus scanning software to
the server, and SSH was used to execute it. Though out of scope, the virus scanning
software recommended SSH and SCP be used, which required that security keys be
created and that the public key of the IRS be shared with the server. Once manually
exchanged, the IRS could securely transfer files and execute commands. The router
did not require strict security requirements, which is why telnet was used to access
it, without login requirements enabled, though in practice in a real network, they
would be enabled.
The Devices layer mentioned in figure 3.3 is concerned with the execution of all hosts
and routers on a network. Since the test-bed is emulated, so too are the network
devices. Virtualization methods are required to run these devices, which is where
docker and dynamips are used (see section 2.4.2). Docker, due to its low resource
usage, is used to virtualize debian computers for both the server and the user on the
emulated network. These computers contain no Graphical User Interface (GUI) and
only essential software for execution. To enable communication between the server
and the IRS, ufw and openssh-client had to be installed to change firewall settings
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and accept SSH and SCP requests, respectively. Like the server host, the user host,
though not performing much, still required specific software to perform its task. The
software the user required was iputils-ping, which comes pre-installed with the de-
bian container, therefore, no additional software had to be installed. The last set of
devices to consider in the emulated network are the routers, which were not able
to be virtualized through normal virtualization software. Instead, these devices re-
quired dyamips, a virtualization software that was able, with the addition of some
software simulation, to emulate the specific hardware seen in Cisco routers. Router
images are needed for the execution of dynamips, which were fortunately supplied
by Cisco for this work.
The IRS can be considered a device of the network, however, it has been separated
to distinguish the software it uses. This work intends to create an IRS that can learn,
which is why tensorflow and tensorforce [23] are used. These two python modules
allow for the easy creation of a reinforcement learning agent. Other software used by
the IRS is python itself, for programming the behavior of the IRS, and lynis, which is
the software used for virus scanning mentioned earlier. All this software combined
forms the IRS, which will be discussed further in the next chapter (4).
3.3.2 Hardware and software
The physical system, as depicted in figure 3.1, executed the emulated environment
using an Intel i7-8700 and 16GB of ram. No Graphical Processing Unit (GPU) ac-
celeration was used for learning, since the learning problem was simple, as will be
discovered in the next chapter (4).
The following list provides a summary of all software used in the test-bed and the
debian docker containers, along with associated version numbers:





Openssh : 7.9p1 (used for SSH and SCP)






OS : debian (server)
Openssh : 7.4p1 (used for SSH and SCP)
Ufw : 0.35 (for local firewall settings)
————————————————————————————————————–
OS : debian (user)
Iputils-ping : 3:20161105 (used for Ping)
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3.4 Summary
This chapter has presented an overview of the test-bed, with explanations as to how
its various components work together. Detail has been provided for the networking
infrastructure and software used. In addition, the hardware was also briefly dis-
cussed. It can be seen that various compromises have been made for the purposes
of reducing modeling complexity and computational overhead. Though not a per-





The previous chapter (3) introduced the emulated network that is used to test the
IRS. The structure of the emulated network and the purpose of each node was dis-
cussed. In addition, the various forms of software used throughout the test-bed
were also discussed in terms of structure and purpose. GNS3 is the main software
component used to construct and manage the emulated network, while docker and
dynamips are used to virtualize the various hosts in that network. These hosts con-
nected to test-bed scripts, which performed the various IDS/IRS related tasks of the
network, though the methods by which they function were not discussed.
The following chapter will expand on the previous chapter by explaining the test-
bed scripts and how they interact with the surrounding environment, such as with
the emulated network. In addition, this chapter will also provide the means to an-
swering the RQs presented in the introduction chapter (1). In particular, a solution
will be provided for RQ1, which allows the IRS to respond according to the type of
attack. The components leading to the solution of RQ2 and RQ3 will also be dis-
cussed in this chapter, however, these RQs will only be solved in the results chapter
(5), after testing has been performed, and only discussed in the final chapter (6),
when conclusions are made.
4.1 Test-bed components
The operations of the experiment are divided into five components: alert, select
response, response, emulated network and timeout models. The alert component
performs the IDS related tasks of the experiment, while the select response and re-
sponse components perform the IRS related tasks. The remaining components are
supplementary, and serve to aid the IRS in its tasks and also help demonstrate the
experiment’s applicability in real world applications. The five components can be
seen in figure 4.1 with the specific processes that each perform, the output of which
can be seen in Appendix A and Appendix B. The following sections will discuss each
component in more detail.
4.1.1 Alert
The alert component serves as the IDS for the experiment, though, the IDS is only
simulated, and does not scan and analyze network traffic to determine network in-
trusions. Instead, IDS alerts are either explicitly called or randomly generated, de-
pending on what attack is being tested. For the purposes of this experiment, three
attack types have been used: DoS, virus and firmware altered. Each attack intends
to test a specific response (see section 4.1.3), as not all responses can be automated
due to issues regarding digital forensics (see section 2.5.2).
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FIGURE 4.1: System procedure
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The DoS alert aims to test automated responses that can be enhanced through rein-
forcement learning, since it is assumed that damage to the network with this attack
will not be irreversible and will only affect its availability. The alerts themselves
are structured to occur multiple times throughout an attack and each attack is struc-
tured to last a specific amount of time. There are multiple attacks, and the amount
of time they last follows a sorted poisson distribution. The intention is to have the
reinforcement learning algorithms learn the randomized poisson distribution, and
thus be able to better predict how long attacks will last. Having the learning algo-
rithms learn a specific distribution will also make it easier to discern whether they
are learning or not in the results chapter (5). An example of both the randomly gen-
erated raw data forming a poisson distribution and the poisson distribution itself
can be seen in figures 4.2 and 4.3 respectively. Following these figures, the first at-
tack would last 38 seconds, with multiple alerts occurring during that time. Attacks
would progressively become longer, and so too would their frequency, until attack
times of 60 were reached, after which, the attack frequencies would decrease.
The virus alert aims to test limited automation, since it is assumed that a quick re-
sponse to a virus will result in less damage to network integrity and confidentiality.
It is also assumed, however, that learning responses, such as which program to run
during a virus attack, are not preferable, as these responses could allow the network
to undergo irreversible damage. Unlike DoS alerts, which are randomly generated,
the virus alerts will only occur when explicitly called. The intention is to allow for
alternate responses when automated ones that adapt through reinforcement learn-
ing are not applicable.
The firmware altered alert aims to show the applicability of no automation, since it
is assumed that a periodic scan that discovers altered firmware on a device, will re-
quire further investigation. For scenarios requiring digital forensics, it is preferable
that no automation takes place, so as to preserve the crime scene (see section 2.5.2).
The intention is to allow for alternate responses when any form of automation is not
applicable.
FIGURE 4.2: Example of the 500 attack instance data used in testing
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FIGURE 4.3: Example of the frequency of the 500 attack instance data
4.1.2 Select response
The select response component serves as the first component of the IRS in the experi-
ment, and is responsible for receiving alerts and choosing the appropriate responses.
Each alert received contains a parameter indicating the type of attack that was iden-
tified. Response selection is performed statically (see static mapping in section 2.1.3),
according to the parameter in the alert. The DoS, firmware altered and virus alerts
(see section 4.1.1) map to the timer, notification and scan responses (see section 4.1.3),
respectively. The following data structure represents this information:
knownAttacks={
‘DoS’ : ‘timer_response’
‘firmware altered’ : ‘notification_response’
‘virus’ : ‘scan_response’
}
It is possible to map a response to multiple attack types, as shown below, however,
for the purposes of this experiment, each response will remain mapped to one attack





Once a response is selected, the appropriate response function is called.
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4.1.3 Response
The response component serves as the second and main component of the IRS in
the experiment, and is responsible for enacting the response chosen in the select
response component (see section 4.1.2). Responses can be enacted in one of three
approaches: timer, notification or scan. Note that some of these approaches inter-
act with the emulated network that contains routers, a client and a server (see sec-
tion 4.1.4).
The timer response prevents communication between a client and a server for a spe-
cific amount of time. To do so, the response system first notes the alert time, which is
used for training purposes for the learning algorithm at a later stage. The response
system then either ignores the alert, or generates what is called the timeout time,
depending on whether or not the timer response is already active. The timeout time
is generated using one of the learning algorithms (see section 4.1.5). Once done,
the gateway router which connects the client to the server (router R1) will block the
IP address of the client (note that this is done statically for testing purposes), thus
preventing further communication. A process, called the timeout process, is then
immediately started, and will activate when the timeout occurs (or when the system
clock reaches the current time + the timeout time). The timeout process is multi-
threaded, and therefore allows newer alerts to be received, however, only the arrival
times of these alerts will be recorded, and the alerts themselves will be ignored, as
a response is already active. Once the timeout occurs, the client’s IP address is un-
blocked, and the accuracy of the timeout time is measured by subtracting the time of
the last alert, from the time that the IP address was unblocked (or when the timeout
occurred). This value, which is denoted as the offset in figure 4.1, is then sent to the
reinforcement learning algorithm for training.
The notification response simply outputs a message to the console, or network ad-
ministrator, about the alert. It is possible to automate some aspects of this response,
such as permanently blocking communications between the client and the server,
until a network administrator can unblock it, however, it is assumed that such au-
tomation could be harmful when digital forensics is required (see section 2.5.2). This
response serves to complete the IRS by providing it with the option to not interact
with the network, which can be beneficial in preventing undue harm to the network
through its own responses.
The scan response automatically isolates the server in order to run a remote anti-
virus tool. The response system does this by disabling the Network Address Trans-
lation (NAT) settings on the gateway router (router R1), that allow the server to
communicate with external IP addresses. The connection between the IRS and the
server, however, remains unchanged, thus allowing the IRS to communicate with
the server. Once the server is isolated from external communication, the IRS copies
an anti-virus tool to the server, and remotely commands it to perform a scan. For
the purposes of this experiment, the anti-virus tool used is lynis. The IRS is able to
wait until the tool is finished, after which, it will reinstate the NAT settings on the
router. The commands to run the scan for the experiment, with 192.168.122.248 being
the server’s local IP address, are seen below. Additionally seen below are the com-
mands used to shutdown the NAT, and to block the client’s IP address (mentioned
in the timer response):
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scp -q ./files/lynis-remote.tar.gz debian
@192.168.122.248:~/tmp-lynis-remote.tgz
ssh debian@192.168.122.248 ’mkdir -p
~/tmp-lynis && cd ~/tmp-lynis &&
tar xzf ../tmp-lynis-remote.tgz &&
rm ../tmp-lynis-remote.tgz && cd lynis
&& ./lynis audit system’












no ip nat inside source static 192.168.1.2 150.1.1.2




access-list 1 deny host 130.20.1.1
end
4.1.4 Emulated network
The experiment makes use of an emulated network to show its functionality. The
emulated network contains five nodes, two of which are emulated Cisco c3745 layer
3 switches, and two of which are debian docker images (see section 2.4.2), that rep-
resent the client and server. The last node, called the IDS/IRS, is the host itself, and
allows communication between the emulated network and the physical host. It is
through this node that response commands (see section 4.1.3) are sent to, and exe-
cuted on, the emulated network devices. A logical diagram showing the direction
of communications, and the entire network within GNS3 showing all associated IP
addresses, can be seen in figures 4.4 and 4.5, respectively. The relevant router con-
figurations for the network can be seen as follows:










ip address 150.1.1.1 255.255.255.0





ip address 192.168.1.1 255.255.255.0
ip nat inside
ip virtual-reassembly
ip route 130.20.1.0 255.255.255.0
FastEthernet1/0
ip nat inside source static tcp
192.168.1.2 22 interface FastEthernet0/0 22















ip address 192.168.1.1 255.255.255.0
ip nat inside
ip virtual-reassembly
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ip route 150.1.1.0 255.255.255.0
FastEthernet1/0
ip nat inside source list 10 interface
FastEthernet1/0 overload
access-list 10 permit 192.168.1.0 0.0.0.255
FIGURE 4.4: Logical network diagram with direction of communica-
tions
FIGURE 4.5: Emulated network structure
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4.1.5 Timeout models
This component makes use of reinforcement learning algorithms to generate an esti-
mate between 0 and 120 on how long an attack will last in seconds. Once generated,
the estimate is then used in the timer response (see section 4.1.3). Reinforcement
learning, as opposed to supervised learning, is specifically used since it is able to
make estimates prior to having learned anything. The learning algorithms were im-
plemented using a python library called tensorforce [23]. Three timeout models have
been incorporated in the experiment, though only two use reinforcement learning,
as one merely performs random guessing for comparison.
The environment the reinforcement learning agent interacts with, is similar to the
K-armed bandit problem, whereby, only one state exists, and the learning agent can
choose from multiple actions, with each giving different rewards. Actions can be
chosen a number of times, and the goal of the reinforcement learning agent is to fig-
ure out which actions obtain the greatest reward (see section 2.3.2). An additional
problem, however, is the non-stationary nature of the environment, whereby, per-
forming the same actions repeatedly will not guarantee the same reward each time.
The reinforcement learning algorithms used were PPO and TRPO (see section 2.3.5).
Default parameters were used for both algorithm in all cases, with the exception of
the learning rate for TRPO, and the actions exploration parameters for both algo-
rithms. Though they are the same, the parameters for both algorithms can be seen
below, with initial_epsilon indicating the chance of exploration, and timesteps indi-

















Once a guess is made, the learning algorithm has to learn how accurate it was.
Higher rewards are associated with better performance. When the offset (mentioned
in section 4.1.3) is sent to this component for training, it is converted into a reward,
with higher values being fed into the learning algorithm, the closer the offset is to
0. The calculation for rewards is seen as follows with timeoutInaccuracy being the
offset time:
reward = 5 / timeoutInaccuraccy
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It should be noted that a value of 0.1 is added to timeoutInaccuracy if it has a value
of 0 (if there was no offset). This is done to avoid a division by 0 and to limit the
maximum reward. In addition to this, only the absolute value of timeoutInaccuracy
is used, and therefore, no negative rewards are given to the learning algorithms.
4.2 Summary
This chapter has listed the various components of the IRS and has shown how they
interact with external components, such as the IDS, the emulated network and the
learning algorithms. The IRS is capable of solving RQ1, by using a static data struc-
ture to select which response to enact given a specific alert. The procedure of all
implemented responses have been listed, and excerpts of commands that the IRS
uses has been provided. In addition to these excerpts are configuration settings for
the routers in the emulated network, the parameter settings for the learning algo-
rithms and a line of code indicating how the rewards for the learning algorithms are
calculated. The knowledge provided by this chapter and the previous chapter (3)




The previous chapter (4) designed an IRS through the use of various components.
While some components were part of the IRS itself, others were external and aided
the IRS in its functioning. One of the internal components used was the select re-
sponse component, which helped solve RQ1, by assigning static responses when
given specific alerts by an external component, namely, the IDS. RQ2 and RQ3,
which asked if the IRS could solve the deactivation issue through learning from
its own responses, still remains unsolved, as testing is required to determine their
success.
The following chapter will provide the results from tests conducted on the timer
response (see section 4.1.3), seen in the IRS that was constructed in the previous
chapter. These results will present the information necessary to determine whether
RQ2 and RQ3 were successful or not, however, this will only be concluded in the
following chapter (6).
Tests were conducted and summarized according to the number of attacks that oc-
curred in the emulated network. The intervals for the number of attacks were 100,
500, 1000 and 2000. The length of the attacks, according to a poisson distribution,
remained at 60 seconds for each interval, due to various limitations (see chapter 6).
Two learning algorithms (see section 4.1.5) were used to test the performance of the
IRS against the deactivation issue. In specific, the IRS algorithms would make esti-
mates as to how long an attack would last, and consequently, how long a response
policy would be enacted for. These estimates were recorded, grouped together, and
graphed according to the frequency of their occurrences (see figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3
and 5.4). In addition to the estimated times for each algorithm, these graphs also
contain the frequency of the actual attack times that each attack lasted for, as well
as the attack times for a random algorithm, which guessed the length of each at-
tack randomly. The data on the actual and random attack times will be used for
comparison purposes in the remaining sections, along with the various tables (see
tables 5.1, 5.3, 5.5, 5.7 and 5.9), which summarize the average offset, or the average
inaccuracy of the guesses made by the learning algorithms and the random algo-
rithm.
5.1 100 Instances
The results for running the test-bed with 100 attack instances can be seen in fig-
ure 5.1 and in table 5.1. Both learning algorithms at 100 attack instances perform
poorly, with an average offset, or inaccuracy estimate of 30 seconds for PPO and 29
seconds for TRPO. The algorithms perform similarly to random guessing, which can
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been seen in the graph, as their estimates form a relatively uniform distribution in
comparison to the poisson distribution of the actual attack times.





TABLE 5.1: Average offsets at 100 attack instances
Algorithm Improvement notes
PPO 0 Performance similar to random guessing
TRPO 0 Performance similar to random guessing
TABLE 5.2: Summary of 100 instances observations
5.2 500 Instances
At 500 instances, improvements start to become noticeable, as can be seen in fig-
ure 5.2 and in table 5.3. PPO improves by 6 seconds, with a new average offset, or
inaccuracy estimate, of 24 seconds. TRPO, however, has only improved by 1 second,
and remains similar to random guessing in terms of performance. The improve-
ments of PPO can be seen in the graph, as a poisson distribution like shape starts to
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form between roughly 50 and 80 seconds. Outside of this range, PPO, again, guesses
relatively uniformly. TRPO, as indicated by the table, has not improved, and still
maintains a relatively uniform distribution.





TABLE 5.3: Average offsets at 500 attack instances
Algorithm Improvement notes
PPO 6 Poisson distribution like shape forming
TRPO 1 Performance similar to random guessing
TABLE 5.4: Summary of 500 instances observations
5.3 1000 instances
At 1000 instances, improvements are made, as can be seen in figure 5.3 and in ta-
ble 5.5. PPO improves drastically by 15 seconds from its previous best, with a new
average offset of 9 seconds. TRPO, however, only improves by 1 second again, and
though still similar to random guessing in terms of performance, it can be seen that
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the algorithm is learning. This is particularly evident in the graph around attack
times of 60 seconds, where TRPO makes most of its guesses. PPO’s performance
is also at its best at attack times of 60 seconds, and proves to obtain near identi-
cal results to the actual. In addition to this, PPO has also made far fewer guesses
at attack times where the actual attack frequency is 0. Unfortunately, performance
has become poor at attack times around 40 and 70 seconds. An explanation for the
discrepancy in performance could result from the difference in training examples
seen at the different attack times. For instance, both algorithms have had roughly
350 training instances for attack times around 60 seconds, whereas, they’ve had less
than 10 training instances for attack times around 40 seconds. Another explanation
could be algorithm behavior, as PPO displays qualities of being too greedy, since it
over estimates the number of attacks at 40 and 60 seconds. This greedy behavior
also prevents the algorithms from adjusting to different attack times, which can be
seen in the low number of guesses in the times that follow (50 and 70 seconds).





TABLE 5.5: Average offsets at 1000 attack instances
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Algorithm Improvement notes
PPO 15 (21 total) Accurate around 60 seconds, Greedy behavior
TRPO 1 (2 total) Performance similar to random guessing
TABLE 5.6: Summary of 1000 instances observations
5.4 2000 Instances
At 2000 instances, both algorithms have learned to some extent, as can be seen in
figure 5.4 and in table 5.7. PPO did not improve despite it training on an extra 1000
instances. It however did not perform any worse than before and still obtains an
average offset of 9 seconds. TRPO, though still not performing as well as PPO, did
improve by 6 seconds from its previous best, and is now distinctly different from
random guessing. The graph shows this, as a trend has formed between the attack
times of 50 and 60 seconds. PPO has also improved outside the attack range of 60
seconds and is still making very few guesses at times where the attack frequency
of the actual is 0, however, it is also making fewer guesses at the attack range of 60
seconds, which could indicate that the algorithm has had troubles adjusting from
what it has learned. This greedy behavior is similar to that seen with 1000 attack
instances, and proof of it can be seen in the high number of guesses at the 50 seconds
range.
FIGURE 5.4: Actual vs estimated attack times for 2000 instances





TABLE 5.7: Average offsets at 2000 attack instances
Algorithm Improvement notes
PPO 0 (21 total) No improvement, Greedy behavior
TRPO 6 (8 total) Poisson distribution like shape forming
TABLE 5.8: Summary of 2000 instances observations
5.5 Analysis and testing
Throughout testing, it can be seen that the performance between both algorithms
improves most around 1000 instances. PPO achieves optimal performance before or
upon reaching 1000 attack instances while TRPO obtains its largest improvement af-
ter 1000 instances. PPO is clearly the better suited algorithm to this problem, which
is a simple problem that does not require complex states or delayed rewards (see
section 2.3.2). TRPO, though performing worse, still showed signs of improvement,
and if given enough training instances, could surpass PPO. Unfortunately, due to
the problem, training on many attack instances isn’t feasible, since it is time con-
suming and impractical, as many networks would suffer greatly without defense
while waiting for an automated IRS to train. The problem is therefore best suited
to algorithms that adapt quickly, but that also remain amenable to change. Though
both algorithms were able to adapt, they showed signs of not being able to change,
as they often got stuck at certain attack times. This frequently happened when many
training instances were available. It may be possible to mitigate this issue through
the use of better parameters for each algorithm, however, finding these parameters
is a time consuming task (see section 2.4.3), especially for a problem that runs in
real-time, and consequently, needs to be tested in real-time.
Algorithm/Instances 100 500 1000 2000
PPO 30 24 9 9
TRPO 29 28 27 21
Random 30 30 29 31
TABLE 5.9: Summary of average offsets
Algorithm Improvement per instance Notes per instance
PPO 0, 6, 15, 0 (21 total) random, poisson, greedy, greedy
TRPO 0, 1, 1, 6 (8 total) random, random, random, poisson
TABLE 5.10: Summary of instance observations
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5.6 Summary
This chapter has presented the results obtained from testing. It can be seen that the
algorithms do learn, as they progressively reduce their average guessing inaccuracy
with increased training instances. Random guessing was used for comparison pur-
poses and always remained at an average inaccuracy of around 30 seconds, while
PPO and TRPO, at their best, obtained an inaccuracy of 9 seconds and 21 seconds re-
spectively. PPO can be identified as the better algorithm, however, its performance
stops improving after 1000 instances. In addition to not improving, the algorithm
frequently uses a greedy approach which limits its ability to adapt, further limiting
its performance. TRPO slowly improves, but does not reach PPO’s performance.
Both algorithms show behavior of performing well where the frequency, or number
of training instances, is large, however, this is likely due to an exploitative approach





This work has presented various aims (see below) for an IRS, that was to be created
to automate the process of responding to network attacks. This chapter will sum-
marize how these aims were achieved, how well the test-bed performed and will
provide concluding remarks as well as possible paths for future work.
The 3 research questions stated at the beginning of this thesis (see section 1.3) in-
tended to design an IRS that is capable of:
RQ1 Responding appropriately according to the type of attack.
RQ2 Learning from the effectiveness of its own responses.
RQ3 Deactivating network policies at optimal times.
6.1 Assessment of research questions
The IRS created in the experiment chapter (4), was designed to be a combination
of an automated response system and a notification system. This combination was
necessary, as it was discovered that not all responses should be automated, as they
may cause damage to the network and interfere with digital forensics related tasks
(see section 2.5.2). Therefore, three categories of responses were created: those that
respond automatically and learned (timer response), those that only respond au-
tomatically (scan response), and those that only notified the network administrator
(notification response). These responses types are summarized in table 6.1 according

















Timer Automated None Proactive Adaptive Static Firewall Supported







Notification Manual N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
TABLE 6.1: Summary of response categories
6.1.1 RQ1 assessment
Switching between the above response types, depending on the type of attack, was
the purpose of RQ1, and while not expressed in any results, it was possible to switch
between response types due to the data structure seen in section 4.1.2. This form of
response selection was the most basic from those available (see section 2.1.3), how-
ever, there was no need for a complex response selection process, as the test-bed only
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used simulated attacks and a simple network. Any additional complexity to the re-
sponse selection process could’ve interfered with testing, in the circumstance that
inappropriate responses were selected. Though while basic, RQ1 was accomplished
through static mapping, and helped to ensure that results from testing remained
consistent.
6.1.2 RQ2 assessment
Like RQ1, much of RQ2 was expressed in the experiment chapter. This RQ aimed
to build an IRS that could learn from its own responses. To achieve this, the timer
response was created, and used two reinforcement learning algorithms, PPO and
TRPO, to learn when to deactivate responses/policies. The algorithms were setup
to be rewarded according to the accuracy of their previous guess. These rewards
would influence the guesses that the algorithm would make in the future. As can be
seen in the results chapter (5), both algorithms were able to learn, as their average
inaccuracies were progressively reduced from 30 seconds as additional training in-
stances were added. This can also be verified by the frequency of attack times seen
in the results chapter, with the trained algorithms more closely representing the dis-
tribution of the actual attack time frequencies. These facts prove that the IRS was
able to learn from its own responses, thus fulfilling the purpose of RQ2.
6.1.3 RQ3 assessment
Unlike the previous two RQs, RQ3 was fully expressed in the results chapter. This
RQ investigated whether the IRS would be able to deactivate response policies at
optimal times. It can be clearly seen from the success of RQ2, that both algorithms,
PPO and TRPO, are capable of learning from their own responses, as both of them
perform better than random guessing, with an average inaccuracy of 9 seconds for
PPO, and 21 seconds for TRPO. Unfortunately, while RQ2 can be regarded as a suc-
cess, and while the algorithms do learn, RQ3 remains questionable, as a 9 second
inaccuracy is not necessarily optimal. In addition to this, both algorithms only per-
form well at attack times close to 60 seconds, and do not achieve optimal response
times outside of this range. Furthermore, the results from PPO indicate that the al-
gorithm’s performance will not improve, meaning that a 9 second inaccuracy is the
best it will achieve. TRPO may perform better if given more training instances, as
it was still improving, even after 2000 instances, but unfortunately, training on this
many attack instances may prove to be too slow for any practical IRS. It may be
possible to improve TRPO’s learning by adjusting its parameters (see section 4.1.5),
however, there are disadvantages to this. For instance, it is possible to make TRPO
more exploitative in order to reduce inaccuracy, however, the issue of exploration vs
exploitation (see section 2.3.4) may appear, whereby, the algorithm will not explore
enough, meaning that TRPO, like PPO, will get stuck in a sub-optimal solution. In-
creasing the learning rate may also contain negative effects, as the algorithm will
place a high priority on correct guesses, however, when the optimal time changes,
or when the guess is no longer correct, the algorithm will have difficulty changing
or adapting to the new optimal time, due to the high priority it has placed on what it
already knows. This issue is a result from the fact that the problem is non-stationary,
meaning that the optimal solutions change as time progresses. Changing discount
will also not improve performance. The reason for this is that discount only affects
whether the learning algorithm is concerned with immediate rewards, or rewards
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in the future. Unfortunately, the problem is very simple, since there is only one ac-
tion and reward associated with a learning, or attack, instance. This means that it is
impossible for the algorithm to consider future rewards, since there is only one re-
ward to be considered. Changing discount from its default value of 0.99 to any other
value, has been tested, and results in no change in TRPO’s performance, which is
why it was left unchanged.
6.2 Assessment of the test-bed
This work approached building a test-bed by using an emulated network. This ap-
proach was chosen to obtain accurate results, while reducing costs and setup time.
The test-bed created was reliable enough to communicate with physical networks,
and, despite some compromises (see section 3.2), was able to replicate the network
necessary for testing. However, the test-bed still contained some limitations which
affected testing. The following sections will discuss these limitations further.
6.2.1 Real-time results gathering
To allow for the emulated network to be stable and extensible enough so as to com-
municate with physical networks, it had to operate in real time. While this does
allow for more realistic results to be obtained, it also limits the number of instances
that can be tested. For example, the time it takes to run the test with 2000 attack
instances is roughly 33 hours. Simulation methods may be better suited, especially
for tests that aim for a number of attack instances larger than 2000. Using simu-
lation may also aid in investigating whether TRPO does infact improve beyond an
average inaccuracy of 21 seconds. While considering adjustments to the number of
attack instances, it may also be worthwhile to consider adjusting the attack times,
and have them differ from 60 seconds. This could not be done in this work, as at-
tack times that were any longer, resulted in testing times greater than 33 hours, and
attack times shorter than this, resulted in a higher chance of the poisson distribution
containing attacks that lasted 0 seconds, which were not considered in this work.
6.2.2 IDS simulation
Though not mentioned in the experiment chapter (4), an IDS was successfully im-
plemented in previous iterations of the test-bed, however, it was removed due to
the large increase in scope and testing time that it required. An IDS would’ve ben-
eficial though, as the learning performed in the IRS would then be affected by the
inaccuracies of the IDS. Specifically, any false-positives, or times at which the IDS
inaccurately guesses an attack when no attack was performed, would accidentally
train the IRS on inaccurate information, leading it to become more inaccurate when
a real attack occurs. The simulated IDS in this work was assumed to have perfect
performance, and does not incorrectly train the IRS.
Another disadvantage of not having a functioning IDS is the inability to test net-
work impairments, as corrupted network data would likely have a negative effect
on the accuracy of the IDS. The increased inaccuracies of the IDS would only serve
to further train the IRS on inaccurate information, making it less effective during
actual attacks. The extent to which network impairments affect the learning of the
IRS would be useful in understanding the feasibility of this work in real networks.
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6.3 Future work
As seen in the assessment of research questions section (6.1), RQ1 and RQ2 were
deemed successful, however, improvements could still be made to RQ3. In particu-
lar, improvements could be made to accuracy and training time. Unfortunately, due
to the limitations of the complexity of the problem tested and specific limitations of
the test-bed (see section 6.2.1), certain approaches that would’ve improved perfor-
mance, couldn’t be implemented. The following will discuss these approaches as
areas of improvement (see sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2) and will also highlight alterna-
tive paths of research for future works, that builds on this work (see sections 6.3.3
and 6.3.4).
6.3.1 Changing algorithms and problem complexity
TRPO and PPO are relatively new algorithms that perform well on simple problems,
but it may be beneficial to consider making the problem more complex, by adding
state information. In doing so, additional algorithms that work well on complex
problems may be tested. The problem can also be made more complex by adding
multiple actions and rewards per attack instance. This would allow the IRS to not
only defend against attacks with multiple steps to them, but would also allow for the
use of the discount parameter, which unfortunately did not have an effect on the per-
formance in this work. The use of state information and multiple actions/rewards
per instance may reduce the inaccuracy of the algorithms to what can be considered
optimal times, thus improving on RQ3.
6.3.2 Hyper-parameter optimization
Hyper-parameter optimization has been mentioned before, but was not implemented,
due to the excessive testing times that would result from its implementation (see
section 2.2.4 and 5.5). However, if a simulated test-bed were to be created, such
that the results reflect those in this work, it may be feasible to implement a form of
hyper-parameter optimization, so that tests could be conducted with the best pos-
sible parameters for each of the algorithms. This would be an improvement, as the
parameters in this work were adjusted manually.
6.3.3 Bootstrapping performance
An alternative area of improvement, related to this work, could be to consider a
form of bootstrapping, whereby another IRS is used to respond to attacks until the
learning algorithm is able to sufficiently respond to attacks itself. This would help
in increasing the maximum amount of training instances available to the learning
algorithm, without causing damage to the network being protected. The difficulty,
however, is that the learning algorithm must undergo training despite the fact that
its actions will not have an effect on the network/environment.
6.3.4 SOAR
The advantage of an automated IRSs is the ability to reduce reliance on network
administrators or human experts. SOAR is a solution stack that similarly aims to
reduce reliance on network administrators by simplifying the process of identifying
attacks and responding to them (see section 2.6.2). This is a process that is not only
time consuming for network administrators, but is also necessary for IRSs. While
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in this work, where the automated IRS responded in an environment in which the
problem was simple, and where responses could be manually constructed, in future
works, it may be necessary to respond to more complex problems, which require
increasingly complex responses (see section 6.3.1). The SOAR solution stack may
provide the standardization necessary to construct these responses, enabling them
to be utilized more effectively by network administrators. The addition of the IRS
in this work would enable these responses to adapt and become more effective over
time. If combined effectively, responses generated by SOAR could be generalized, so
that they become applicable to many similar attacks, which the learning IRS would
then optimize. This combination would further reduce the reliance on network ad-
ministrators, more than if each system acted independently.
6.4 Summary
This work approached building an IRS that was capable of learning from its own
responses. If successful, it would reduce the reliance of network administrators by
more effectively responding to attacks and aiding in the solution of the deactivation
issue. The background and construction can be seen in chapter 2, and chapters 3
and 4, respectively, while chapters 5 and 6 discuss the findings of this work. It can
be seen that the IRS created does learn, and is capable of adjusting to attack type,
allowing it to safely respond to DoS attacks without risk to the network being pro-
tected. However, it does not perform optimally, as can be seen by the outcome of
RQ2 (see section 6.1.2). The performance of the IRS is however, not unexpected, as
the problem and the complexity of the IRS were simplified to test the feasibility of
a self learning IRS. Several future enhancements have been identified which could
potentially improve performance, and perhaps provide for a more complete and
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PING 150.1.1.2 (150.1.1.2) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=3 ttl=62 time=22.6 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=4 ttl=62 time=29.2 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=5 ttl=62 time=25.9 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=6 ttl=62 time=21.8 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=7 ttl=62 time=28.1 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=8 ttl=62 time=25.2 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=9 ttl=62 time=33.4 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=10 ttl=62 time=24.3 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=11 ttl=62 time=24.1 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=12 ttl=62 time=25.0 ms
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64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=13 ttl=62 time=25.7 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=14 ttl=62 time=25.9 ms
From 150.1.1.1 icmp_seq=15 Packet filtered
From 150.1.1.1 icmp_seq=16 Packet filtered
From 150.1.1.1 icmp_seq=17 Packet filtered
From 150.1.1.1 icmp_seq=18 Packet filtered
From 150.1.1.1 icmp_seq=19 Packet filtered
From 150.1.1.1 icmp_seq=20 Packet filtered
From 150.1.1.1 icmp_seq=21 Packet filtered
From 150.1.1.1 icmp_seq=22 Packet filtered
From 150.1.1.1 icmp_seq=23 Packet filtered
...
From 150.1.1.1 icmp_seq=69 Packet filtered
From 150.1.1.1 icmp_seq=70 Packet filtered
From 150.1.1.1 icmp_seq=71 Packet filtered
From 150.1.1.1 icmp_seq=72 Packet filtered
From 150.1.1.1 icmp_seq=73 Packet filtered
From 150.1.1.1 icmp_seq=74 Packet filtered
From 150.1.1.1 icmp_seq=75 Packet filtered
From 150.1.1.1 icmp_seq=76 Packet filtered
From 150.1.1.1 icmp_seq=77 Packet filtered
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=78 ttl=62 time=28.2 ms
From 150.1.1.1 icmp_seq=79 Packet filtered
From 150.1.1.1 icmp_seq=80 Packet filtered
From 150.1.1.1 icmp_seq=81 Packet filtered
From 150.1.1.1 icmp_seq=82 Packet filtered
From 150.1.1.1 icmp_seq=83 Packet filtered
From 150.1.1.1 icmp_seq=84 Packet filtered
From 150.1.1.1 icmp_seq=85 Packet filtered
From 150.1.1.1 icmp_seq=86 Packet filtered
R1:
*Mar 1 00:00:43.803: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I:
Configured from console by vty0 (192.168.122.1)
*Mar 1 00:01:47.319: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I:
Configured from console by vty0 (192.168.122.1)
*Mar 1 00:01:48.003: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I:














* Some tests will be skipped (as they require root permissions)
* Some tests might fail silently or give different results
- Detecting OS... [ DONE ]




Operating system name: Debian
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Lynis security scan details:
Hardening index : 55 [########### ]
Tests performed : 183
Plugins enabled : 0
Components:
- Firewall [V]
- Malware scanner [X]
Lynis Modules:
- Compliance Status [?]
- Security Audit [V]
- Vulnerability Scan [V]
Files:
- Test and debug information : /tmp/lynis.log
- Report data : /tmp/lynis-report.dat
================================================================================
...
Info: Scan done, server reconnected
python alert.py 6.65s user 0.31s system 20% cpu 33.525 total
Client:
PING 150.1.1.2 (150.1.1.2) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=1 ttl=62 time=30.2 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=2 ttl=62 time=29.1 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=3 ttl=62 time=23.6 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=4 ttl=62 time=27.4 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=5 ttl=62 time=21.4 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=6 ttl=62 time=25.8 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=7 ttl=62 time=29.6 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=8 ttl=62 time=23.9 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=9 ttl=62 time=568 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=10 ttl=62 time=630 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=11 ttl=62 time=45.4 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=12 ttl=62 time=25.2 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=13 ttl=62 time=25.2 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=14 ttl=62 time=35.6 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=15 ttl=62 time=35.6 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=16 ttl=62 time=35.1 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=17 ttl=62 time=35.2 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=18 ttl=62 time=36.2 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=19 ttl=62 time=35.9 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=40 ttl=62 time=30.7 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=41 ttl=62 time=29.8 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=42 ttl=62 time=30.4 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=43 ttl=62 time=31.0 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=44 ttl=62 time=21.7 ms
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64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=45 ttl=62 time=21.7 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=46 ttl=62 time=21.8 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=47 ttl=62 time=21.9 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=48 ttl=62 time=22.7 ms
64 bytes from 150.1.1.2: icmp_seq=49 ttl=62 time=23.1 ms
R1:
*Mar 1 00:04:18.807: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I:
Configured from console by vty0 (192.168.122.1)
*Mar 1 00:04:45.487: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I:
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